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This paper attempts to describe how inflation and different kinds of
anti-inflationary policies affect the financial structure of private firms.
The Argentine experience between 1967 and 1980 is examined, using
information for the whole economy and a sample of individual firms.
Section 7.1 relates main stabilization attempts, examines the characteris-
tics of sources and costs of financing faced by private firms, and pays
particular attention to conditions created by the last stabilization plan.
Section 7.2, using information from a sample of individual firms for the
1976-1980 period, analyzes the changes in the structure of assets and
liabilities and the composition of costs and profitability of firms brought
about by changes in general financial and economic conditions.
7.1 Stabilization Policies and Their Impact
on Private Sector Financing
Section 7.1.1 outlines major aspects of the inflationary process of the
1967-1980 period and describes key anti-inflationary measures pursued
in each of the five subperiods identified for analytical purposes. Section
7.1.2 shows the development of different sources of finances for private
business over the last fifteen years, relating them to changes in financing
costs in various markets. Section 7.1.3 concentrates on the last stabiliza-
tion plan, comparing it with the 1967-1969 program, with which it shares
several features.
Domingo F. Cavallo and A. Humberto Petrei are respectively Director and Director of
Research of the Instituto de Estudios Economicos Sobre la Realidad Argentina y Lati-
noamericana (IEERAL), Fundacion Mediterranea, Cordoba, Argentina.
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"Source: Banco Central de la Reptiblica Argentina. 1975. Sistema de cuentas delproducto e
ingreso de la Argentina, vol. 2, and quarterly updating reports.
bInstituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos. Boletin Trimestral, several issues.
cSecretaria de Hacienda. Unpublished manuscripts.
7.1.1 Inflation and Stabilization Attempts during 1967-1980
The 1967-1980 period was characterized by high and variable rates of
inflation, ranging from 4 to 386 percent per year as measured by the
wholesale price index. Five different subperiods may be identified by
their various anti-inflationary policies. The main characteristics of the
economic policies and the performance of the economy in these sub-
periods, using key economic indicators, are given in table 7.1. Cost of
financing faced by private business is a central variable in the discussion
that follows. Table 7.2 lists the various rates in each of the relevant
markets.
1967-1969: The Krieger-Vasena Plan
While combating inflation was the central objective of the Krieger-
Vasena plan, emphasis was also given to stimulating the growth of the
economy. The plan consisted of an initial 40 percent devaluation of the
peso (partially compensated by the introduction of taxes on traditional


























































































































dBanco Central de la Republica Argentina. Boletin Estadtstico Mensual and Memorias
Anual, several issues.
eAs percentage of exports, plus imports, divided by 2.
fOrganizaci6n Techint. 1979. Boletin Informativo, no. 214.
exchange rate, the relaxation of constraints on trade and capital move-
ments, and a system of voluntary price agreements and wage controls. In
addition, steps were taken to make fiscal and monetary policies compati-
ble with inflation targets. The government deficit was drastically reduced
and kept around 1 percent of GDP, while the rate of growth of domestic
credit roughly averaged the sum of the rate of growth of real income plus
the planned rate of inflation. Inflation went down to 7 percent per year
from 21 percent and 27 percent as measured by the wholesale and cost of
living indices, respectively. The annual rate of growth of GDP went up
from 2.6 to 8.5, and real wages increased by an average of 2.5 percent per
year. The plan's major constraint was the balance of payments, where a
crisis developed as a result of a reduction in beef production and exports
caused by the relatively low beef prices of previous years.
The central bank directly controlled interest rates in domestic financial
markets without, however, reaching negative rates in real terms (see
table 7.2). Except for 1967, the devaluation year, the cost of credit was
higher in the domestic market than in the foreign markets. The cost of
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chased exchange insurance. The large difference between these two costs
in 1968-69 reflects devaluation expectations, which in turn explain the
reduction of foreign reserves by more than the current account deficit,
even though without exchange insurance foreign financing was still
cheaper than domestic borrowing.
1970-1972: Anti-inflationary Targets Abandoned
This period was dominated by the objective of solving the balance of
payments problem. Anti-inflationary targets were abandoned as the gov-
ernment, involved in a political plan to transfer power to politicians, put
emphasis on avoiding recession. The year 1970 was transitional. A 14
percent devaluation of the peso occurred but the fiscal and monetary
discipline still existed that characterized the previous period. During 1971
and 1972 that discipline was relaxed; a dual exchange rate system was put
into effect with a big initial devaluation of the peso for financial transac-
tions while the exchange rate for real transactions was being devalued
more gradually. The balance of payments problem was being solved
gradually, helped by very favorable terms of trade existing at the end of
the period. Real growth slowed down, though a deep recession was
avoided and, on average, real wages remained unchanged over the
period. Since nominal interest rates in the domestic markets were still
controlled by the central bank, real rates became increasingly negative as
inflation accelerated throughout the period. With the exception of the
cost of credit from foreign markets in the big devaluation year (1971),
real interest rates were negative in all the markets, including the incipient
"bill bank acceptances" market with free interest rates.
1973-1974: The Gelbard Plan
The main objective of the Gelbard plan, under the Peronist govern-
ment, was to increase real wages and achieve high levels of economic
activity. Very strict price controls and the establishment of a fixed ex-
change rate were the main instruments used to fight inflation. The gov-
ernment deficit rose to almost 7 percent of GDP, and credit expanded at a
rate of 82 in 1973 and 60 in 1974. The natural result of these policies was
the development of increasingly important black markets for almost
every good. At the beginning of the period, very favorable export prices
helped to maintain the exchange rate as previously fixed, but soon strict
exchange controls and import restrictions were necessary to keep it. In
1974 the price differential between the dollar in the black market and the
official rate averaged 63 percent and was rising. Inflation was kept be-
tween 30 percent and 40 percent per year, according to the different
indicators, but it was an evident situation of repressed inflation. Real
wages increased over the period by 30 percent and real output by 10
percent. As in the previous period, interest rates, controlled by the158 Domingo F. Cavallo/A. Humberto Petrei
government, were predominantly negative, and by the end of the period
credit rationing became more and more important.
1975-1976: Inflationary Explosion
As a natural consequence of repressed inflationary conditions and a
climate of political crisis caused by internal disputes in the Peronist party
and by the intensification of terrorism, a dramatic increase in the rate of
inflation took place in 1975. The rate of devaluation of the peso was
around 450 percent, and still the price of the dollar in the black market
almost doubled the official price. The government deficit more than
doubled, and controls of credit expansion and money supply were lost. In
1975 the annual inflation rate rose to around 350 percent, and by the first
quarter of 1976 it reached a figure of 900 percent. Real output declined
for the first time since 1963, and real wages began to deteriorate.
In April 1976 a new military government put an emergency plan into
operation which included a big devaluation, the imposition of nominal
wage ceilings, the lifting of existing controls on commodity prices, and
several measures to reduce the government deficit. The expansion of
credit was still out of the central bank's control as the government faced
huge losses because of the subsidized sales of dollars in the futures market
that had been committed during the last part of the previous government
period to induce an inflow of foreign capital necessary to cope with the
balance of payments crisis. In 1976 the rate of inflation was similar to that
of the previous year, real output declined again, and real wages were
reduced by almost 37 percent. By the second part of 1976 the rate of
inflation had been more than halved. The balance of payments crisis had
been overcome by an increase in export earnings due to a strong supply
response to the price incentives given to exporters by the devaluation of
the peso and the elimination of export taxes. During this period, domes-
tic borrowing and foreign borrowing with exchange insurance received
subsidies at an annual rate of around 60 percent. However, the real cost
of foreign credit without exchange insurance was almost 100 percent in
1975.
1977-1980: The Martinez de Hoz Plan
During this period fighting inflation again became an explicit aim of
economic policy. Together with this objective, economic policy ad-
dressed the reestablishment of the conditions of a free market economy
opened to the rest of the world. After a temporary period of price control
on leading firms, anti-inflationary policy between mid-1977 and the end
of 1978, was based on the control of money supply, and after 1978 was
based on an announced declining rate of devaluation. Neither of these
two different anti-inflationary strategies were clean examples of what is
taught in conventional macroeconomic theory. On the one hand, the159 Financing Private Business in an Inflationary Context
attempt to control money supply was not accompanied by a floating
exchange rate. The government reacted to the inflow of foreign capital,
resulting from the contraction of domestic credit, by imposing controls on
international capital movements. During 1978 a zero interest rate deposit
in domestic currency, equivalent to 20 percent of the amount of the loan,
was imposed on borrowers in foreign markets. On the other hand, during
1979 and 1980 the announcement of a devaluation rate was made in such a
way that did not create enough certainty in the market. The relatively
short periods for which the announcements were valid and the announce-
ments' lack of clarity, together with the reluctance of the minister to
make firmer commitments to his program (as that would have meant the
intervention of the central bank in the futures market for the exchange
rate), caused a high degree of uncertainty regarding the exchange rate
policy. This uncertainty was greater during 1980 as the deficit in the
current account of the balance of payments widened. In addition to the
imperfect design of these monetary policies, the government deficit,
although significantly smaller than in previous years, still amounted to
3-4 percent of GDP. This made the attempts to control credit expansion
very costly in terms of high real interest rates and the control of the
nominal exchange rate very costly in terms of real exchange rate de-
terioration and accumulation of a current account deficit.
Between September 1977 and March 1978 the annual interest rate in
real terms was around 100 percent as a consequence of the attempt to
reduce, in the second half of 1977, the rate of growth of the money supply
from 10 percent a month to 4 percent. The price of traded goods relative
to nontraded goods declined by more than 30 percent during 1979 and
1980, as reflected by the difference between changes in wholesale and
cost of living indices, which can be taken as proxies for traded good and
nontraded good prices. Inflation remained almost constant for three
years at 150 percent per year, a figure which was reached in the second
part of 1976. It was only during the last quarter of 1979 that the inflation
rate began to decline significantly.
Real output grew during the second part of 1976 and most of 1977, but
declined sharply during 1978 as a result of a substantial increase in real
interest rates that took place in the last quarter of 1977 and the first part of
1978. Real output recovered again during 1979 as real interest rates were
declining, thanks to a relatively high level of confidence in the govern-
ment and to a declining rate of devaluation that provided an inflow of
foreign capital and kept down domestic interest rates. During 1980 real
output was stagnant as real interest rates increased again because of
increasing uncertainty regarding the exchange policy and because of the
deterioration of the real exchange rate which affected incentives in the
production of traded goods. During the whole period, real wages tended
to recover from the deep fall of 1976, but they did not reach the pre-160 Domingo F. Cavallo/A. Humberto Petrei
Peronist levels. Since 1977 the cost of credit in real terms was very high in
the domestic financial market while borrowing in foreign markets had
negative costs, ranging from -22 percent to -5.3 percent per year.
7.1.2 Sources and Costs of Finance
Table 7.3 shows sources of investment funds for private firms in real
terms for each of the policy periods described in section 7.1.1. Table 7.4
presents the same information as percent of gross investment.
Sources of finances are classified as external and internal to the firms.
The external sources contain debt financing from different domestic stock
markets and from direct foreign investment. The internal sources in turn
are classified as net results from operating in each of the financial markets
and as depreciation allowances and profits. The former was estimated
from information on the real financial cost in each market as reported in
table 7.2, and the latter was obtained as the difference between gross
private investment and all the other sources of financing.
The first observation emerging from tables 7.3 and 7.4 is that significant
amounts are listed under debt financing and internal sources of financing.
Sources of external equity capital financing were generally unimportant,
except for direct foreign investment during the Krieger-Vasena period.
The stock market has been negligible as a source of finances, and it has
remained so irrespective of different stabilization plans. Debt financing
became important during the stabilization programs of Krieger-Vasena
(1967-1969) and Martinez de Hoz (1977-1980). When anti-inflationary
policies were abandoned or when repressed inflation exploded, as in the
1970-1972 and 1975-1976 periods, internal sources of finances became
dominant.
Depreciation allowances and operating results are the most important
and stable components of internal sources. A clear correlation exists
between the proportion they represent and the rate of growth of real
output. The proportion of finance gained from operating in financial
markets varied substantially between the periods in a way which is
negatively correlated with the share of debt financing.
Debt financing and net results from operating in financial markets are
consolidated in tables 7.5 and 7.6. A relatively stable pattern prevails
over the last fifteen years, indicating that the contribution of domestic
and foreign financial markets to the financing of private business is
independent of the composition of that contribution. When inflation is
being fought, as in the Krieger-Vasena and Martinez de Hoz programs,
firms rely strongly on additional debt. When inflation accelerates and real
interest becomes negative, as in 1970-1972 and 1975-1976, firms collect
important subsidies in financial markets which add up to profits.
With respect to the relative importance of different financial markets,
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Table 7.5 Net Amount of Financial Resources Obtained by Private Business
via New Debt and Results from Operating in Financial Markets,
Argentina, 1967-1980 (Yearly Averages in Millions of Pesos at
Constant Prices of 1970)








































Sources: See Appendix A.
The higher the inflation rate, the less the controlled markets are chosen
by investors, and the more difficult it is for the government to exercise
effective controls. Because of this problem, the Martinez de Hoz anti-
inflationary plan was aimed at freeing interest rates.
The role of foreign financial markets does not show a clear trend or a
neat association with the degree of control exercized over inflation by
government. While the role of foreign financing was almost negligible
during the years of the Krieger-Vasena plan, it played an important role
during the Martinez de Hoz years. Its role was also important during the
1970-1972 period of neglected anti-inflationary targets as a result of the
restrictions imposed by the government on foreign-owned firms which
wanted to get financing in the domestic market and as a result of the
widespread use of exchange insurance to make foreign financing attrac-
tive to private firms. The net resources provided by foreign financial
markets during the 1975-1976 inflationary explosion were very small and
Table 7.6 Structure of Net Amount of Financial Resources Obtained by
Private Business from Operating in Financial Markets, Argentina,











































Sources: See Appendix A.164 Domingo F. Cavallo/A. Humberto Petrei
would have been still smaller had the government not resorted to a
subsidized exchange insurance and other strong incentives to keep firms
borrowing from abroad. The different role that foreign financial markets
played in the Krieger-Vasena plan compared with the Martinez de Hoz
program is discussed in section 7.1.3.
The preceding discussion has concentrated on comparing the anti-
inflationary policy years, on the one hand, and the uncontrolled inflation
years, on the other, but specific comments have not been made on the
Gelbard years (1973-1974). The Gelbard plan, although attempting to
control inflation, included a set of internally inconsistent policies, such as
strict price controls, a fixed exchange rate, large government deficits, and
an expansionary monetary policy, which made a very poor anti-
inflationary plan. Economic conditions in which different sources of
finances played their roles during 1973 and 1974 were in part similar to the
anti-inflationary policy years and in part to the periods of uncontrolled
inflation.
7.1.3 A Closer Look at the Krieger-Vasena and
Martinez de Hoz Periods
Let us now concentrate on the differences in the structure of the
sources of finances between the Krieger-Vasena and the Martinez de Hoz
plans.
Depreciation allowances and operating results played a more impor-
tant role during the first period. They represented 75 percent of overall
private investment as compared to 60 percent in the second period,
suggesting that private business was more profitable during the Krieger-
Vasena years. This is not surprising because the voluntary wage and price
controls that were included in that plan aimed precisely at making the
fight against inflation consistent with the expansion of economic activity.
In the case of the Martinez de Hoz plan, more emphasis was placed
on introducing structural changes, like the opening up of the economy;
these turned out to be costly in terms of the level of economic activity in
the short run, since recession has a negative effect on profitability.
While the bulk of foreign resources came as direct foreign investment
during the Krieger-Vasena period, during the Martinez de Hoz period
the most important part of foreign sources was debt financing. This
difference is, in part, the result of the same policies that led to the
different levels of profitability of private business between the two
periods. The expanding economy of the Krieger-Vasena years offered
better opportunities for profitable, direct foreign investment than the
structurally changing economy of the Martinez de Hoz period. The
significant role of foreign debt financing during the latter period was
related to the magnitude of the interest rate differential between domes-
tic and foreign markets that was created by attempts to control domestic
credit expansion in an economy with a significant government deficit.165 Financing Private Business in an Inflationary Context
Private business had to pay a positive real cost for debt financing during
both periods, but in the Krieger-Vasena case those real costs did not
differ much whether domestic or foreign funds were used. That was not
the case during the Martinez de Hoz period, because firms paid higher
costs when borrowing in domestic markets and collected an important
subsidy when borrowing in foreign markets. Part of this difference could
have been eliminated if the uncertainties about the ability of the govern-
ment to keep the devaluation within the announced schedules had been
removed, but an important proportion of these differences is related to
attempts to reduce domestic credit expansion when the government
deficit was not reduced simultaneously.
7.2 Changes of Firms' Balance Sheets, 1976-1980
In order to analyze the behavior of different sources of finances as well
as changes in the structure of assets, data were gathered for a sample of
seventy-eight private corporations for the period 1976-1978. The data
were gathered from firms whose shares are traded in the Buenos Aires
Stock Exchange, using quarterly balance reports. The aggregation was
made from balance sheets whose dates were close to mid-year. Results
for the whole sample are analyzed first, then two divisions are made
between small and large firms and between firms producing traded goods
and nontraded goods.
7.2.1 Results for the Whole Sample
Table 7.7 reports in proportional terms the main results for the sample
as a whole. In addition, several key balance sheet ratios, which are shown
in table 7.8, were computed to illustrate the analysis.
The assets side of the balance sheet shows no major changes between
the proportion of total assets held as physical or financial capital. A
significant decline in the relative importance of inventories since 1977 is
perceived, which is an expected result from policy changes regarding
interest rates during the period.
The liabilities side shows important changes. There is an increase in
long-term debt financing and a consequent decline in the proportion of
net worth. This change is the consequence of the drastic reduction of
profitability, as may be seen in the profit and loss statements.
The shortening of the terms of deposits and loans as a consequence of
inflation and the variability of interest rates is a well-known phenomenon
not only in Argentina. As a result of institutional arrangements, this
shortening of terms was accentuated in the Argentine domestic market at
the initial stage of the financial reform, that is, immediately after June
1977. The main factor working in that direction was a system of com-
pensation for interest paid by banks on that part of time deposits that
could not be lent due to the high proportion of reserve requirements166 Domingo F. Cavallo/A. Humberto Petrei
Table 7.7 Argentina 1976-1980. Balance Sheets, Profit and Loss Statements












































































































































Sources: See Appendix B.
imposed by the central bank. The required compensation changed every
month and was known only for the current month. Therefore, banks,
when lending long, not only faced the risk of changing interest rates but
also the risk of changes in the proportion of nonlent time deposit costs
that the central bank decided to compensate (see Arnaudo, Cavallo, and
Dadone 1978). How did this increase in long-term liabilities of firms come
about? Part of it came through foreign financial markets, that is, foreign
financing was chosen by firms not only because it was cheaper but also
because it provided terms appropriate to the role those resources were
called to play: to substitute for the deterioration of the internal sources of
financing. The other part of the increase in long-term financing came
from the domestic financial system as special financing for long-term
investment by the state-owned banks; some of this was the result of debt
refinancing by firms that faced financial problems. As can be seen in table
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interest rates went up to almost 100 percent per year in real terms,
provoking economic losses and financial crises in many firms. This re-
financing was mainly undertaken by the state-owned banks. However, in
early 1980 the central bank allowed the banks to use an index based on
the deposit rate to facilitate the granting of long-term indexed loans, even
though the banks were still receiving only short-term deposits (see Ca-
vallo and Dadone 1979). This institutional arrangement, together with
the new spurt of financial crises that showed up in 1980, accelerated the
transformation of short-term liabilities into long-term ones.
The composition of short-term liabilities shows an important decline in
commercial credit compensated by an increase in bank credit. This
change is a natural outcome of the growth of financial intermediation
brought about by the liberalization of interest rates.
The profit and loss statements reveal important facts that seem to be
related to the changing nature of the stabilization plan within the Mar-
tinez de Hoz period. The drastic decline of profitability experienced in
1978 was basically the result of a significant increase in financial costs,
while a similar decline in profitability registered in 1980 is explained by a
big reduction of gross margin. In other words, by the end of 1977 and the
beginning of 1978, the stabilization plan, based on the control of the
money supply, was pressing inflation down by an important increase in
the real rate of interest. By the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, the
inflation was being pressed down by foreign competition and the control
of the exchange rate. By the middle of 1981, balance sheets will surely
register a still more drastic decline in profitability which will be the effect
of both the control of the nominal exchange rate and an important
increase in real rates originating in the increasing uncertainty about the
future exchange rate policy, unless the Martinez de Hoz stabilization plan
collapses as current political events seem to suggest as this paper is being
written (January 1981).
The ratios reported in table 7.8 summarize the main changes in the
financial structure of firms during the period. The deterioration of net
worth produced an increase in the first immobilization index from 100 to
almost 130, but firms managed to keep more or less constant the rela-
tionship of long-term assets and net worth plus long-term liabilities, as it
is registered by the second immobilization index. In spite of the de-
terioration of profitability and the associated difficulties, firms seem to
have been cautious in keeping liquidity within the usual rates. Overall
leverage increased dramatically from 67.9 to 106.2, with the bulk of the
increase registered in long-term leverage. Firms tried, on average, to
collect the subsidy associated with operations in the foreign financial
markets and to avoid the high real rates of the domestic markets. That is
registered by the leverage in foreign currencies index and by the opposite169 Financing Private Business in an Inflationary Context
movement of the net financial position in both domestic and foreign
currencies.
7.2.2 Differences between Small and Large Firms
Tables 7.9 and 7.10 report for small firms the same type of information
given in tables 7.7 and 7.8, and tables 7.11 and 7.12 do the same for large
firms.
The structure of large firms is almost identical to that of the aggregate
of firms. Therefore, differences in behavior will be observed mainly in
table 7.9. What emerges from it is the observation that smaller firms had a
smaller increase in leverage and a reduced access to long-term credit and
foreign financing. The smaller reliance on debt financing should have
helped the firms get higher profits, but this effect was largely outweighed
Table 7.9 Argentina 1976-1980. Balance Sheets, Profit and Loss Statements
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Table 7.11 Argentina 1976-1980. Balance Sheets, Profit and Loss Statements














































































































































Sources: See Appendix B.
by the negative effect on profits caused by the inability of small firms to
collect the subsidy associated with foreign financing. This is clearly
reflected by the behavior of the net financial position on domestic and
foreign currencies, and it is the source of the huge losses shown in the
1978 and 1980 statements. Financial costs for small firms were almost
three times those of large firms.
7.2.3 Differences between Producers of Traded and Nontraded Goods
Tables 7.13 and 7.14 report balance sheet structures and ratios for
corporations producing nontraded goods, and tables 7.15 and 7.16 do the
same for corporations producing traded goods.
While profitability did not vary much through the period for the
producers of nontraded goods, it did vary greatly for the producers of
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Table 7.13 Argentina 1976-1980. Balance Sheets, Profit and Loss Statements
for a Sample of Private Corporations That Sell Nontraded Goods
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Balance Sheets



























































































Profit and Loss Statements
































Sources: See Appendix B.
exchange rate during the period as a consequence of the balance of
payments crisis at the beginning and the reliance on controlling the
money supply and the nominal exchange rate in the following years. In
addition, structural adjustments made as a result of the opening of the
economy obviously affected the producers of traded goods more. Access
to foreign credit, as to other long-term loans, seems to have been easier
for producers of nontraded goods, although producers of traded goods
should have demanded a higher proportion of credit in foreign currencies
because of the link between their sale prices and the exchange rate.
Difficulties created for the finances of private business by the stabilization
policy were much more important for producers of traded goods than for
producers of nontraded goods.
Foreign financing was channeled mainly into the domestic economy by
the local branches of foreign banks. These banks applied evaluation rules
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Table 7.15 Argentina 1976-1980. Balance Sheets, Profit and Loss Statements














































































































































Sources: See Appendix B.
goods. Smaller firms and the producers of riskier, traded goods had to get
their financing from institutions which operated almost exclusively with
domestic funds.
7.3 Conclusions
The experience of Argentina between 1970 and 1976 shows that relaxa-
tion of anti-inflationary targets, uncontrolled inflation, and negative real
interest rates provide an automatic solution to the financing of private
business. The most important aspects of private business financing in such
a context are to sort out the limitations imposed by the credit rationing
criteria and to be able to collect the highest possible amount of subsidies
in the financial markets. In this context, foreign financing is avoided
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When stabilization plans are applied, financial management again
becomes relevant for private business because internal sources of financ-
ing are insufficient, and the real cost of debt financing becomes positive
and relevant in most of the financial markets. This is shown by the
analysis of the Krieger-Vasena and Martinez de Hoz plans. The compari-
son of these two experiences shows that the financial problems of private
business can significantly increase by special features of the stabilization
plans, like large credit requirements by the public sector originating in big
government deficits and the imposition on firms of costly structural
adjustments caused by long-term policies (e.g., the opening of the econ-
omy). The simultaneity of these two sources of complications can be
damaging to the success of the stabilization plan, because large govern-
ment deficits are the source of large interest rate differentials between
domestic and foreign markets and the overvaluation of the domestic
currency when domestic credit creation is controlled. Under these condi-
tions an uneven distribution of the stabilization burden is likely to result
as small firms and producers of traded goods face difficulties in obtaining
financing in foreign markets and are compelled to pay the high real costs
of domestic credit. These differences are clearly shown by the balance
sheet structures and ratios for a sample of corporations during the period
1976-1980.
Balance sheet figures show that after 1976 there was a significant
reduction of inventories on the assets side, and on the liabilities side,
short-term bank debt replaced, in part, short-term commercial debt.
These are expected results of the higher real interest rates and the
increase in short-term financial intermediation resulting from the liber-
alization of interest rates.
More surprising is the increase in leverage, especially in the form of
long-term debt. Although domestic banking regulations did not favor the
development of the long-term debt market, the increase in long-term
debt relative to net worth took place mainly as a result of an increase in
financing from abroad, special investment financing provided by state
banks, and refinancing of debts for firms facing financial problems. Net
worth was negatively affected by the drastic reduction of profitability that
is observed especially in 1978 and 1980.
The central analytical question that emerges from the observation of
the Argentine experience during the Martinez de Hoz period is: Why do
firms rely more and more on debt financing even though it is very costly in
real terms? When entrepreneurs are faced with this question, the usual
answer is that losses have to be financed and debt financing is the only
available alternative. But why not a more drastic reduction of fixed
investments accompanying the observed reduction of inventories? There
are several institutional reasons that can explain why there is no big
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cheaper credit from the state-owned banks which is earmarked for new
investments; the existence of fiscal incentives, like reduced tariffs on
capital good imports and tax credits. The recent Argentine experience
suggests that still another explanation of more general interest exists.
Doubts about the soundness of the government's commitment to main-
tain its anti-inflationary strategy create uncertainties that keep alive the
expectation that the high real cost of credit is a transitory phenomenon.
Previous experience suggests that every anti-inflationary plan is followed
by a period of accelerating inflation that reverses the sign of financial
costs. Of course, there are instrumental aspects of anti-inflationary poli-
cies which can create unnecessary uncertainties, like the simultaneous
announcement of contradictory targets and the reluctance of the govern-
ment to adopt a firm commitment to its policies, the success of which
depends crucially on people's confidence that those policies will be main-
tained for a long period of time.
Appendix A Sources and Methodology for
Table 7.3
Debt financing was computed as the difference between the amount of
debts at the end and the beginning of the periods, deflated by the
Wholesale Price Index of December of the respective year. The sources
and coverage of the different components are the following:
Debt with Domestic Markets. Banco Central de la Republica Argen-
tina. Boletin Estadistico Mensual, several issues. These figures were
obtained by subtracting from A/3 (financial assets held by the nonfinancial
private sector) the debt of the public sector net of deposits with the
financial system and net foreign assets of the financial system. The
disaggregation between free and controlled interest rate markets was
done by allocating to the free interest rate market the amount of the "bill
bank acceptances" from 1970 to 1975, and the "bill bank acceptances"
plus the amount of time deposits in 1976. From 1977 the whole debt is
with the free interest rate market.
Debt with Foreign Markets. A. Arnaudo and R. Bartolomei. 1967-
1971. Mercado cambiario e inflation, Argentina. Mexico: CEMLA; and
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina. Memorias Anual, several
issues. The disaggregation into debt with and without exchange insur-
ance was done by allocating to the first one the net sales of foreign
exchange in the futures market by the central bank at the end of each
year, as reported by the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina.
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Equity capital financing was computed from annual flow figures, de-
flated by the annual average of the Wholesale Price Index. The sources of
the two components were:
Stock Market. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina. Memorias
Anual, several issues.
Direct Foreign Investment. Ministerio de Economia. 1967-1976. Un-
published manuscript; and Banco Central de la Republica Argentina.
1977-1980. Memorias Anual, several issues.
Net results from operating in financial markets were obtained using the
information on debt financing and table 7.2 as follows: the profit (+) or
loss (-) in each market is obtained for each year by multiplying the initial
debt at constant price times the real interest rate.
Depreciation allowances and operating results were calculated as the
difference between gross private investment and all other sources.
Gross private investment was calculated as the difference between
overall gross investment and gross public investment. The former was
taken from Banco Central de al Republica Argentina. 1975. Sistema de
cuentas del producto e ingreso de la Republica Argentina, vol. 2, and
quarterly updating reports; and Banco Central de la Republica Argen-
tina. 1980. Gerencia de investigacion estadisticas Economicas. Gross pub-
lic investment was estimated from the information reported in Ministerio
de Economia. 1980. Evolucion econdmica de la Argentina.
Appendix B Sampling Criteria
A list of all corporations whose shares are traded in the Buenos Aires
Stock Exchange was prepared, recording their names, main industrial
groups, and amounts of sales from their last balance sheet reports. A
sample comprised of approximately 25 percent of the firms was taken.
Corporations were classified by industrial group and by three size
categories. Size was determined on the basis of sales. Limits for size
stratification were determined in order to have an equal number of firms
in each stratum. Therefore, a two-entry table (one by size and the other
by industrial group) was constructed.
Firms were selected from the first-size stratum (big firms) and the
third-size stratum (small firms) only. The criterion was to select a sample
of 20 percent of all the firms from each cell (similar size and same
industrial group) with a minimum of three. In the case of incomplete or
missing information, firms were replaced by others within the same cell
when possible.
The classification of firms in the traded goods and nontraded goods
categories was made on the basis of a correlation between changes in180 Domingo F. Cavallo/A. Humberto Petrei
wholesale prices of the group of products corresponding to the industrial
groups used in the study and changes in the price of the dollar. Those
groups that showed a simple correlation coefficient of greater than 60
were classified as traded good producers, and those with a lower correla-
tion coefficient as nontrade good producers.
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Comment Charles E. McLure, Jr.
Inflation-induced shifts in financial policy, such as those described by
Cavallo and Petrei, would be expected by most economists. But they
often can be captured only through the most imaginative and sophisti-
cated use of advanced econometric techniques. A country such as Argen-
tina, in which large shifts have occurred in macroeconomic policy, the
rate of inflation, and real interest rates, provides the economist with
virtually a laboratory experiment in which responses to changes in eco-
nomic incentives can be observed much more easily. Even so, I am rather
amazed at the degree to which Cavallo and Petrei have been able to
discern clear patterns of response to changes in financial incentives
created by changes in inflation and anti-inflation policies. Most of these
responses are quite in line with what one would expect. There are some
apparent anomalies, but the authors are able to provide reasonably
convincing explanations, even in those cases.
Unanticipated inflation reduces real interest rates. This may, of course,
affect saving and the availability of foreign capital. More to the point, if
inflationary expectations are not symmetric, so that business firms expect
a higher level of inflation than do lenders, and therefore a lower real rate
of interest, there should be a decisive shift toward the use of debt
financing by business.
Much of what appears to have occurred in Argentina confirms eco-
nomic intuition. When inflation produced low real interest rates, firms
m
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attempted to capitalize on the situation through debt financing. But when
interest rates were controlled at nominal levels that produced negative
real rates, domestic funds dried up. Firms also seem to have responded in
the way expected when restricted credit creation produced differentials in
domestic and foreign interest rates or when subsidized insurance against
exchange rate risk reduced the cost of borrowing abroad.
The one really anomalous result is the apparent lengthening of debt
that occurred when inflation accelerated. I would have welcomed more
evidence for the proposition that this lengthening can be traced to financ-
ing of long-term investment by state-owned banks. This might have been
provided by a more detailed classification of sources of finance, if such is
available. It would probably be difficult to document the assertion that
refinancing of debts by firms in financial trouble was a further contributor
to the increase in long-term financing.
My next comments reflect my background as a tax economist. We all
know that inflation and the various policies governments adopt to fight it
should have important influences on the way private businesses choose to
operate and finance themselves. In the United States we think especially
of effects working through the taxation of business income. If tax depre-
ciation is based on the historical cost of assets, there will be a tendency for
costs of goods sold to be understated and for profits subject to tax to be
overstated. Similar effects can occur with inventories. If firms use first-in,
first-out (FIFO) methods for valuing inventories, whether because they
are required to do so by fiscal authorities or because they simply prefer to
do so, perhaps in order to show larger book profits, taxable income will
tend to be greater than economic income. Both these effects will tend to
discourage investment in physical assets, and patterns of finance may
adjust. Offsetting these tendencies is the allowance of deductions to firms
for nominal interest payments. In many instances this more than offsets
the first two tendencies to overstate profits. The incentive for firms to
employ debt financing resulting from the interaction of inflation and the
deducibility of nominal interest costs is accentuated if businessmen
expect greater inflation than is reflected in the cost of funds in financial
markets.
Not until the very end of their paper do Cavallo and Petrei mention the
fiscal system of Argentina. But one can hardly help wondering the extent
to which fiscal influences, including those mentioned earlier, were active
in Argentina during the period of variable inflation under examination.
In particular, I am not sufficiently familiar with the Argentine tax system
to know whether depreciation allowances are based on historical cost
depreciation or if replacement cost depreciation or indexing is allowed.
Similarly, is FIFO required, or is LIFO (last-in, first-out) an acceptable
method of inventory evaluation? Finally, is there any indexing of the
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inflationary period? Perhaps even more important, there is no indication
of whether the tax system has been stable over the period covered by the
paper. Without attempting a very long shopping list, I might note that
one wonders whether the treatment of depreciation or inventories might
have changed in any important way during the period, whether provisions
relating to the taxation of the return to lenders might have been altered,
and whether the deductibility of interest (and nondeductibility of div-
idends, for that matter) changed during the period. Beyond that, one
needs to know whether there are explicit subsidies to credit of one kind or
another that might have been changed during the period.
The division of internal sources of finance into "net results from
operating in financial markets" and "depreciation allowances and operat-
ing results" is, I believe, quite useful. Particularly noteworthy is that
when the first of these is added to external debt financing this combined
source of investment funds is a relatively stable contributor to the total.
Calculating "depreciation allowances and operating results" as a residual
has the virtue that one need not worry that they are calculated directly
from financial statements, without adequate allowance for the effects of
inflation. The same cannot, of course, be said for the information con-
tained in tables 7.7-7.16. One does not know the extent to which inven-
tories and long-term assets have been revalued to reflect inflation. Nor
can one determine this from the data in the paper, since only ratios are
provided. Do the commonly accepted financial standards in Argentina
allow (or require) the revaluation of assets? This question has its counter-
part in the profit and loss statements. Do the depreciation allowances and
deductions for inventories used in the figures for cost of sales reflect
inflation? Are the relatively modest rates of profits real, or do they
contain fictitious profits resulting from inflation? Without satisfactory
answers to these questions, I am a bit uneasy about attributing changes in
financial patterns to intertemporal differences in profitability of firms.
I believe that this study could be usefully extended in several direc-
tions. First, I would expect producers of traded goods to be relatively
large, and small firms to be especially heavily involved with the produc-
tion of nontraded goods. Given that patterns of effects of inflation on
financial practices are quite different for small firms and producers of
traded goods, on the one hand, and for large firms and producers of
nontraded goods, on the other hand, it may be that results from either
two-way classification (traded vs. nontraded; large vs. small) really
understate significant differences that would be revealed from a four-way
(two-by-two) classification. That is, one might expect large producers of
nontraded goods to be affected quite differently from small producers of
traded goods, with the remaining two categories falling somewhere in
between. It would be useful to have such a cross-classification, if the data
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A further exercise that would be useful, if data are available, would be
to attempt to gain information on Argentine subsidiaries of foreign firms
similar to that used for firms traded on the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange.
While it is important to know how firms with primarily domestic own-
ership respond to inflation and anti-inflationary policies, it would be
equally interesting to know how foreign-owned firms have responded to
the same economic stimuli.
Comment Andrew Abel
Domingo Cavallo and Humberto Petrei address the issue of financing
private business in Argentina in the presence of high and variable rates of
inflation. Their paper is an interesting blend of three sections: a brief
review of Argentine macroeconomic performance from 1967 to 1980; an
analysis of the sources of finance for investment based on aggregate data
over this entire fourteen-year period; and an analysis of a sample of
individual firm balance sheets during the Martinez de Hoz period (1977-
1980).
The review of the Argentine economy provides an excellent introduc-
tion to readers not completely familiar with the Argentine experience.
Cavallo and Petrei divide the fourteen-year period into five subperiods
according to the extent to which government policies were directed
against inflation. Because the paper focuses on the financing of private
business, the macroeconomic summary properly devotes much attention
to the behavior of interest rates—both nominal and real. However, the
real interest rates tabulated by Cavallo and Petrei are apparently ex post
pretax real interest rates. The interest rate relevant for decision making
by firms is the ex ante after-tax real interest rate. The difference between
ex ante and ex post real interest rates is equal to the forecast error of the
rate of inflation. Although it may be reasonable to suppose that the
forecast error has a mean of zero so that the ex post real rate is an
unbiased measure of the ex ante real rate, the variance of this forecast
error was probably quite large in Argentina. Since the reported ex post
real interest rate is the sum of the ex ante real interest rate and the
forecast error of inflation, the variance of the reported ex post real
interest rate may greatly exceed the variance of the relevant ex ante real
interest rate.
The distinction between pretax and after-tax real interest rates de-
pends on the tax treatment of interest payments. It is well known that if
nominal interest payments are tax deductible, then the after-tax real
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interest rate can be negative even though the pretax real interest rate is
positive. Furthermore, the observation that the pretax real interest rate
was higher in 1967-1969 than in 1970-1972 does not imply that the
after-tax real interest rate was higher in 1967-1969 than in 1970-1972,
even if the tax rate was the same in both periods. Of course, these
comments apply to a situation in which nominal interest payments are tax
deductible. It would be useful if the authors could briefly describe the tax
treatment of interest payments in Argentina.
Perhaps the most interesting result of the analysis of the aggregate
sources of finance is the finding that firms use external debt financing
when inflation is being successfully fought, but they use internal financing
when inflation is not being fought successfully. The most volatile compo-
nent of internal financing is net results from operating in financial mar-
kets. Cavallo and Petrei point out that the sum of external debt financing
and internal financing is much more stable than either of the two separate
components. To interpret this finding, we observe that
(1) »-y.
where b is the real value of bonds outstanding, B is the number of bonds
outstanding, v is the nominal value of a bond, and P is the price level.
Differentiating (1) with respect to time and then subtracting rb from both
sides of the equation, we obtain
(2) b
where r is the nominal interest rate, and TT = PIP is the rate of inflation.
The first term on the left-hand side of (2) is the change in the real value
of outstanding bonds and corresponds to the Cavallo-Petrei measure of
external debt financing.
The second term on the left-hand side of (2) represents net results from
operating in financial markets and is equal to the decrease in the real
value of existing bonds [IT - (vlv)]b minus the real value of nominal
interest payments rb. Observe that the real value of existing bonds
decreases both because of general price inflation (TT) and because of any
decrease in v, perhaps as a result of an increase in interest rates. Cavallo
and Petrei measure the net results from operating in financial markets as
(IT - r)b, thereby ignoring capital gains or losses arising from the chang-
ing nominal valuation of existing bonds resulting from changing interest
rates or interest rate expectations. Recognizing that r = p
e + ir
e is an
identity (ignoring any taxation of interest) in which p
e is the ex ante real
rate of interest and TT
6 is the expected rate of inflation, the Cavallo-Petrei
measure of net results from operating in financial markets is
[(ir — TT
6) — p
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operating in financial markets is high when inflation is not fought success-
fully, and low when inflation is successfully combated, is that the ex ante
real interest rate, p
e, is fairly stable over time and that variations in
[(TT — ir
e) — p
e]b are mostly the result of variations in forecast errors
about inflation. When inflation is lower than expected, the net operating
results in financial markets are low; when inflation is higher than ex-
pected, net operating results in financial markets are high.
The Cavallo-Petrei result that the sum of external debt financing and
net operating results in financial markets is more stable than its two
components is equivalent to noting that the right-hand side of (2) is more
stable than each of the two terms on the left-hand side of (2). The
right-hand side of (2) is the excess of the real value of newly issued debt
over the real value of interest payments on existing debt. This remains
fairly stable in the presence of large swings in unanticipated inflation
which cause large but opposite swings in the two terms on the left-hand
side of (2). The swings in observed external debt financing and in
observed net operating results are not the outcome of explicit action on
the part of firms. Rather, much of the variation in the observed measures
of these two sources of financing is due to variations in unanticipated
inflation.
From the analysis of the sample of individual firm balance sheets in the
period 1976-1980, it was found that a major source of profitability
differences between large firms and small firms and between producers of
nontraded goods and producers of traded goods is access to foreign
credit. The real cost of credit was substantially lower in foreign markets
than in domestic markets. Small firms and producers of traded goods
tended to use foreign credit less than large firms and producers of non-
traded goods, and their profitability suffered. The observation that small
firms were generally confined to the domestic credit market with a higher
interest rate than in the foreign market leads to an anomaly in the data on
inventories. Cavallo and Petrei point out in table 7.7 a decline in the
relative importance of inventories since 1977 and link this to policy
changes regarding interest rates. However, table 7.9 reveals that for small
firms, which as a group faced higher interest rates than the aggregate, the
share of inventories in total assets actually rose over the period 1976—
1980.
Cavallo and Petrei have skillfully* combined data from different sources
to provide some insights into the financing of private business in the
presence of inflation. As they point out in their conclusion, further
research is required to understand the behavior of investment during the
Argentine experience with inflation.